As the materialistic perspective emphasizes concrete conditions, it tends to minimize the constitutive aspects of the law: the physical realities of organizational life should not depend on the presence or absence of legal descriptions – especially since economic actors can generally, by mutual agreement, indicate everything that is not yet defined by law. Nevertheless, in some of the writings of the transaction, at least embryonic, there are references to a materialistic approach to the constitutive law. Pylons (1990), for example, suggests that the fundamental distinction between markets and hierarchies lies in the “standard” rules that govern these two types of economic activity. While a carefully crafted network of contract contracts can theoretically achieve the same results as a corporate charter, the prefabricated presentation of business creation probably relieves the cognitive burden of building such a relationship. Given that human beings are entirely rational, it follows that many organizations would never see the light of day without this legal definition of support. Constitutive law can therefore have a significant influence on the world of organization by simply creating a fundamental framework of categories and rights (Campbell and Lindberg in 1990, Dobbin and Sutton in 1998). 1) According to the theory of well-being, there is only a reasonable consideration if a promise is made in the benefit of the promise or at the expense of the promise that prompts the promise of something else for the beneficiary of the promise. For example, promises that are not pure gifts are not considered enforceable, as the personal satisfaction that the donor can obtain from the promise by the act of generosity is generally not considered a sufficient inconvenience to obtain adequate consideration. 2) Under the idea of a good deal for exchange, there is appropriate thinking when a promisor makes a promise in exchange for something else.
Here is the essential condition that the promisor was given something specifically to induce the promise made. In other words, the theory of good deal for exchange differs from the theory of damage-benefit by the fact that the centre of gravity of the theory of the exchange of parties seems to be the reason for making the promises and subjective mutual consent of the parties, while the emphasis on damage-benefit theory seems to be an objective legal disadvantage or an advantage for the parties. Each contract must include a specific offer and acceptance of that specific offer.